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 Non-tradeables have been the bulk generator of employment in developing countries 
 Non-tradeables are particularly vulnerable to distortion from extractive institutions 
 We identify the impact of extractive institutions on non-tradeable prices 
 Institutions and regulations quality are negatively related with non-tradeable prices 
 Effects are heterogeneous across institution quality and resources rents distribution 
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Abstract 
We are interested in the hypothesis that in order to promote export competitiveness and create jobs, it 
is necessary to address major distortions to prices in the non-tradeable sector. Exports drive growth in 
developing countries, yet most employment growth is generated in non-tradeable sectors. We 
contribute to the previous literature by explaining how non-tradeable sectors are particularly 
vulnerable to distortions arising from extractive and poor quality institutions. We estimate an IV-
GMM model on a sample of low-middle income countries, finding evidence of a strong relationship 
between the growth of non-tradeable prices and the quality of local institutions. Overlooking the 
distortions in non-tradeable sectors could limit the analysis of constraints to economic growth and 
transformation in developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
For policy purposes, we are interested in the hypothesis that to promote export competitiveness and 
create jobs, it is necessary to address major distortions to prices in non-tradeable sectors. Exports 
drive growth in developing countries, but evidence has shown how non-tradeable rather than 
manufacturing industries have been the bulk generator of employment in the last decades, accounting 
for almost 70% of total employment, and might be the motor of inclusive growth (Brooks, 2012).
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However, these sectors are particularly vulnerable to distortion from “extractive institutions”, by 
which powerful groups generate or extract rents from economic activities and create costs for others, 
mainly because of the closed domestic nature of these sectors and the relatively inelastic demand for 
non-tradeable goods (Kahn and Jomo, 2000; Acemoglu, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; 
Pritchett et al. 2017). 
The contribution of this study is to identify the impact of extractive institutions in non-tradeable 
sectors, specifically looking at the relative prices for non-tradeable goods. We implement a dynamic 
IV-GMM to examine the relationship between changes in institutions’ quality and non-tradeable 
relative prices. By identifying these distortions we fill a gap in the current policy and academic 
discussions on institutions, growth and economic transformation. Our work contributes to the 
literature on “development without industrialization” analysing growth in developing countries whose 
production is skewed to services, suggesting a strong relationship between tradeable competitiveness 
and non-tradeable costs (Gollin et al. 2016; Glaeser and Henderson, 2017; Lall et al. 2017; Venables, 
2017). Extractive institutions are likely to distort prices of non-tradeables disproportionately, with 
potential negative externalities for tradeable sectors. 
In addition, we contribute to the literature on institutions, market distortions and economic growth 
(Rodrik, 2004; Haltiwanger et al. 2013). Indeed, most of the previous empirical evidence has focused 
                                               
1 Non-tradable goods are products and services not traded internationally. These include products whose producers and 
consumers are mainly located in the same local market, and whose trading costs prevent their export. Generally, if the price 
of the good is mainly set by local supply and demand, the item should be considered non-tradable (Jenkins et al, 2011). In 
this study we consider non-tradeable the electricity, gas, water supply industry, housing and households’ services sectors. 
These sectors are particularly closed to imports and foreign investment, especially in low-middle income countries where 
imports to such industries account for less than 10% of sectoral GDP (UN COMTRADE, 2017). 
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
on the role played by institutions in shaping economic development and growth, rather than focusing 
on the possible distortive effect on prices (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al. 2004). 
2. Data and Methodology 
We employ time series on prices in tradeable and non-tradeable sectors using consumer price indexes 
(CPIs) provided by the ILO for a sample of 88 developing countries between 2002 and 2014.
2
 We 
calculate the relative price for non-tradeables as the change in the non-tradeable CPI relative to the 
change in the general CPI. To measure institutional quality we rely on two databases provided by the 
World Bank and largely used in the previous literature, the “World Governance Indicators” and the 
“Doing Business” databases (William and Siddique, 2008; Alvarez et al. 2018).3 We use principal 
component analysis to create two indicators of institutions quality, one for each database, which 
statistically summarize the underlying data and weight each indicator according to its additional 
variability (Langbein and Knack, 2010). 
To estimate how an improvement in institutions and business regulations quality affects the growth of 
relative prices in non-tradeable sectors, we employ a dynamic two-step difference IV-GMM (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991), controlling for the instruments potential weakness and benchmarking it with an 
OLS model: 
                                                                
                       
          is the change in the relative price of non-tradeables at time t in country c,        the 
growth in the World Governance Index while        the growth in the Ease of Doing Business 
Index. We control for unemployment     , imports of services       , GDP per capita       , 
population growth        , share of natural resources rents over GDP           and we include 
                                               
2 The World Bank categorised in 2002 low (LIC) and low-middle income (LMIC) countries with an income per-capita below 
2,395 USD, 4,035 USD in 2014. Alternative sources of price data have been considered, however those were either limited 
to specific countries and industries or cross-sections for single years, thus not allowing a dynamic analysis. As a robustness 
test, in Table A3 we use the World Bank CPI data from 2002 to 2011 validating the main results. 
3 The WGI database includes six dimensions of governance including accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption control. The EDB includes indicators on the easiness of starting 
a new business, getting construction permits, registering property rights, getting credit, pay taxes, trading across borders, 
enforcing contracts and resolve insolvencies. 
country    and year fixed-effects   .
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 As instruments we use infants’ mortality rate, which has been 
found to be linked with democracy, political and institutional conditions, but not with prices (Zweifel 
and Navia, 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Shandra et al. 2004), as well as the 
potentially endogenous independent variables      and       lagged up to t-4. In addition we lag 
by one period all other control variables. 
3. Results  
In Table 1 we compare the results of the OLS and GMM estimations. Column 2 shows a negative 
relation between institutions quality and non-tradeable prices in LMICs, where a one standard 
deviation increase (0.29) in the WGI index is associated with a reduction by almost 1.8% in the 
relative price of non-tradeables, while one standard deviation increase in the EDB index (0.24) is 
related with a 3.64% reduction in the relative price of non-tradeables. These effects are relevant 
especially in LMICs where poorer business regulations might generate rents and the creation of 
monopolies. These results corroborate and generalize the country and sector-specific findings of the 
previous literature on rent generation in non-tradeable sectors, in particular regarding the relevance of 
business regulations and competition policies in promoting the provision of efficient non-tradeables, 
preventing the creation of oligopolies and the generation of rents (Love and Martinez-Peria, 2015; 
Rijkers et al. 2017).  
Figure 1 shows the heterogeneous effect of improvements in the WGI index across the distribution of 
the EDB and vice versa, suggesting in panel B that improvements in business regulations are 
particularly beneficial for countries with poorer governance institutions, while in panel A that 
governance enhancements reduce non-tradeable inflation in countries with already relatively stronger 
business regulations. Moreover, the negative relationship between WGI/EDB indexes and non-
tradeable prices is particularly strong for countries with low resources rents intensities in panels C-D. 
Countries heavily dependent on natural resources rents show a positive relationship between 
institutions quality and non-tradeable prices, probably because of a “Dutch disease” effect where 
                                               
4 Summary statistics reported in Table A2 in the appendix. 
commodity exporting countries experience non-tradeable inflation despite improvement in their 
governance (Nkurunziza et al. 2017).
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Table 1: Impact of institutions quality on the relative prices of non-tradeable goods. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IV-GMM OLS 
  General LMIC General LMIC 
WGI 0.0209 -0.0630*** -0.102 -0.111** 
  (0.0516) (0.0244) (0.168) (0.065) 
EDB -0.147*** -0.187*** 0.172 -0.192** 
  (0.0130) (0.0365) (0.110) (0.098) 
U 0.0788*** 0.540*** -0.0515 -0.0157 
  (0.0120) (0.0330) (0.0337) (0.0650) 
IMP -0.0316*** -0.0310*** -0.0148 -0.0178*** 
  (0.00666) (0.0058) (0.0193) (0.0002) 
GDP 0.110*** 0.0288 0.0398*** 0.0272 
  (0.0251) (0.0552) (0.0107) (0.0818) 
POP 0.639*** -0.388** 0.152 0.190 
  (0.0284) (0.187) (0.116) (0.249) 
NATRES -0.00386 -0.0292* -0.0249 -0.0204* 
  (0.0103) (0.0150) (0.0245) (0.0107) 
Observations 1,178 525 1,178 525 
No. Countries 149 88 149 88 
AR(2) 0.276 0.999 - - 
Hansen 0.158 0.998 - - 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014. Estimators used are a first-difference panel OLS and IV-GMM 
with country and year fixed-effects. Instrumental variables used in the two-step difference GMM include infants’ mortality rate, and the lags 
of the WGI and EDB indexes up to t-4. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels: *** p<0.01, **<0.05, * p<0.1. 
4. Conclusions 
Non-tradeable sectors are particularly relevant for economic development and inclusiveness given the 
evidence that, even when growth is led by manufacturing exports, most jobs come from these 
industries. Our analysis shows how non-tradeable sectors are particularly vulnerable to distortions 
arising from extractive institutions. Countries interested in inclusive growth should take interest in the 
impact of institutions and pro-competitive business regulations on the performance of non-tradeable 
sectors, since these have direct employment implications and potential positive externalities both for 
domestic market and export-oriented tradeable industries. 
 
                                               
5 Additional robustness tests reported in Tables A4-A8 in the appendix.  
Figure 1: Impact of WGI, EDB and resources rents interactions on the prices of non-tradeables. 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014 using an IV-GMM with country and year fixed-effects. Distribution 
of the WGI, EDB and natural resources rents intensity reported in quartiles from the bottom (1) to the top (4) quartiles. 
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The supplementary materials include additional description of the data and further robustness 
tests of our main results. Table A.1 lists the countries included in our study and their income 
classification in 2002 and 2014 according to the World Bank, while Table A.2 presents a few 
descriptive statistics for the main variables included in the econometric analysis. Table A.3 
tests the results presented in Table 1 of the paper using the World Bank CPI data for the 
period 2002-2011 instead of the ILO CPI data. Tables A.4 and A.5 control for 
multicollinearity, first by including separately the WGI and EDB variables, and secondly by 
including individually all the different components of the WGI and EDB indexes to show 
which are the most important factors related to the reductions in the relative non-tradeable 
prices. Table A.6 reports the results of the GMM estimations including up to 9 lags of the 
WGI and EDB variables, while Table A.7 reports the first-stage of the IV-GMM estimation. 
Finally, Table A.8 reports the comparison of the results in Table 1 benchmarked by both an 
OLS and an IV-OLS model. 
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